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Abstract
Many organizations wish to collaboratively train machine learning models on their combined datasets
for a common benefit (e.g., better medical research, or fraud detection). However, they often cannot share
their plaintext datasets due to privacy concerns and/or business competition. In this paper, we design and
build Helen, a system that allows multiple parties to train a linear model without revealing their data, a
setting we call coopetitive learning. Compared to prior secure training systems, Helen protects against a
much stronger adversary who is malicious and can compromise m− 1 out of m parties. Our evaluation
shows that Helen can achieve up to five orders of magnitude of performance improvement when compared
to training using an existing state-of-the-art secure multi-party computation framework.
1 Introduction
Today, many organizations are interested in training machine learning models over their aggregate sensitive
data. The parties also agree to release the model to every participant so that everyone can benefit from
the training process. In many existing applications, collaboration is advantageous because training on
more data tends to yield higher quality models [44]. Even more exciting is the potential of enabling new
applications that are not possible to compute using a single party’s data because they require training on
complementary data from multiple parties (e.g., geographically diverse data). However, the challenge is that
these organizations cannot share their sensitive data in plaintext due to privacy policies and regulations [3] or
due to business competition [71]. We denote this setting using the term coopetitive learning1, where the word
“coopetition” [31] is a portmanteau of “cooperative” and “competitive”. To illustrate coopetitive learning’s
potential impact as well as its challenges, we summarize two concrete use cases.
A banking use case. The first use case was shared with us by two large banks in North America. Many banks
want to use machine learning to detect money laundering more effectively. Since criminals often hide their
traces by moving assets across different financial institutions, an accurate model would require training on
data from different banks. Even though such a model would benefit all participating banks, these banks
cannot share their customers’ data in plaintext because of privacy regulations and business competition.
A medical use case. The second use case was shared with us by a major healthcare provider who needs to
distribute vaccines during the annual flu cycle. In order to launch an effective vaccination campaign (i.e.,
sending vans to vaccinate people in remote areas), this organization would like to identify areas that have high
1We note that Google uses the term federated learning [71] for a different but related setting: a semi-trusted cloud trains a model
over the data of millions of user devices, which are intermittently online, and sees sensitive intermediate data.
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Figure 1: The setting of coopetitive learning.
probabilities of flu outbreaks using machine learning. More specifically, this organization wants to train a
linear model over data from seven geographically diverse medical organizations. Unfortunately, such training
is impossible at this moment because the seven organizations cannot share their patient data with each other
due to privacy regulations.
The general setup of coopetitive learning fits within the cryptographic framework of secure multi-party
computation (MPC) [8, 41, 74]. Unfortunately, implementing training using generic MPC frameworks is
extremely inefficient, so recent training systems [60, 45, 58, 38, 21, 39, 5] opt for tailored protocols instead.
However, many of these systems rely on outsourcing to non-colluding servers, and all assume a passive
attacker who never deviates from the protocol. In practice, these assumptions are often not realistic because
they essentially require an organization to base the confidentiality of its data on the correct behavior of other
organizations. In fact, the banks from the aforementioned use case informed us that they are not comfortable
with trusting the behavior of their competitors when it comes to sensitive business data.
Hence, we need a much stronger security guarantee: each organization should only trust itself. This goal
calls for maliciously secure MPC in the setting where m− 1 out of m parties can fully misbehave.
In this paper, we design and build Helen, a platform for maliciously secure coopetitive learning. Helen
supports a significant slice of machine learning and statistics problems: regularized linear models. This family
of models includes ordinary least squares regression, ridge regression, and LASSO. Because these models are
statistically robust and easily interpretable, they are widely used in cancer research [52], genomics [29, 63],
financial risk analysis [67, 18], and are the foundation of basis pursuit techniques in signals processing.
The setup we envision for Helen is similar to the use cases above: a few organizations (usually less than
10) have large amounts of data (on the order of hundreds of thousands or millions of records) with a smaller
number of features (on the order of tens or hundreds).
While it is possible to build such a system by implementing a standard training algorithm like Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) [65] using a generic maliciously secure MPC protocol, the result is very inefficient.
To evaluate the practical performance difference, we implemented SGD using SPDZ, a maliciously secure
MPC library [1]. For a configuration of 4 parties, and a real dataset of 100K data points per party and 90
features, such a baseline can take an estimated time of 3 months to train a linear regression model. Using a
series of techniques explained in the next section, Helen can train the same model in less than 3 hours.
1.1 Overview of techniques
To solve such a challenging problem, Helen combines insights from cryptography, systems, and machine
learning. This synergy enables an efficient and scalable solution under a strong threat model. One recurring
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theme in our techniques is that, while the overall training process needs to scale linearly with the total number
of training samples, the more expensive cryptographic computation can be reformulated to be independent of
the number of samples.
Our first insight is to leverage a classic but under-utilized technique in distributed convex optimization
called Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) [15]. The standard algorithm for training models
today is SGD, which optimizes an objective function by iterating over the input dataset. With SGD, the
number of iterations scales at least linearly with the number of data samples. Therefore, naı¨vely implementing
SGD using a generic MPC framework would require an expensive MPC synchronization protocol for every
iteration. Even though ADMM is less popular for training on plaintext data, we show that it is much more
efficient for cryptographic training than SGD. One advantage of ADMM is that it converges in very few
iterations (e.g., a few tens) because each party repeatedly solves local optimization problems. Therefore,
utilizing ADMM allows us to dramatically reduce the number of MPC synchronization operations. Moreover,
ADMM is very efficient in the context of linear models because the local optimization problems can be
solved by closed form solutions. These solutions are also easily expressible in cryptographic computation
and are especially efficient because they operate on small summaries of the input data that only scale with the
dimension of the dataset.
However, merely expressing ADMM in MPC does not solve an inherent scalability problem. As
mentioned before, Helen addresses a strong threat model in which an attacker can deviate from the protocol.
This malicious setting requires the protocol to ensure that the users’ behavior is correct. To do so, the parties
need to commit to their input datasets and prove that they are consistently using the same datasets throughout
the computation. A naı¨ve way of solving this problem is to have each party commit to the entire input dataset
and calculate the summaries using MPC. This is problematic because 1) the cryptographic computation
will scale linearly in the number of samples, and 2) calculating the summaries would also require Helen to
calculate complex matrix inversions within MPC (similar to [61]). Instead, we make a second observation
that each party can use singular value decomposition (SVD) [42] to decompose its input summaries into
small matrices that scale only in the number of features. Each party commits to these decomposed matrices
and proves their properties using matrix multiplication to avoid explicit matrix inversions.
Finally, one important aspect of ADMM is that it enables decentralized computation. Each optimization
iteration consists of two phases: local optimization and coordination. The local optimization phase requires
each party to solve a local sub-problem. The coordination phase requires all parties to synchronize their
local results into a single set of global weights. Expressing both phases in MPC would encode local
optimization into a computation that is done by every party, thus losing the decentralization aspect of the
original protocol. Instead, we observe that the local operations are all linear matrix operations between the
committed summaries and the global weights. Each party knows the encrypted global weights, as well as its
own committed summaries in plaintext. Therefore, Helen uses partially homomorphic encryption to encrypt
the global weights so that each party can solve the local problems in a decentralized manner, and enables
each party to efficiently prove in zero-knowledge that it computed the local optimization problem correctly.
2 Background
2.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the notation we use for the rest of the paper. Let P1, ..., Pm denote the m parties.
Let ZN denote the set of integers modulo N , and Zp denote the set of integers modulo a prime p. Similarly,
we use Z∗N to denote the multiplicative group modulo N .
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We use z to denote a scalar, z to denote a vector, and Z to denote a matrix. We use EncPK(x) to denote
an encryption of x under a public key PK. Similarly, DecSK(y) denotes a decryption of y under the secret
key SK.
Each party Pi has a feature matrix Xi ∈ Rn×d, where n is the number of samples per party and d is
the feature dimension. yi ∈ Rn×1 is the labels vector. The machine learning datasets use floating point
representation, while our cryptographic primitives use groups and fields. Therefore, we represent the dataset
using fixed point integer representation.
2.2 Cryptographic building blocks
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the cryptographic primitives used in Helen.
2.2.1 Threshold partially homomorphic encryption
A partially homomorphic encryption scheme is a public key encryption scheme that allows limited com-
putation over the ciphertexts. For example, Paillier [62] is an additive homomorphic encryption scheme:
multiplying two ciphertexts together (in a certain group) generates a new ciphertext such that its decryption
yields the sum of the two original plaintexts. Anyone with the public key can encrypt and manipulate the
ciphertexts based on their homomorphic property. This encryption scheme also acts as a perfectly binding
and computationally hiding homomorphic commitment scheme [43], another property we use in Helen.
A threshold variant of such a scheme has some additional properties. While the public key is known to
everyone, the secret key is split across a set of parties such that a subset of them must participate together to
decrypt a ciphertext. If not enough members participate, the ciphertext cannot be decrypted. The threshold
structure can be altered based on the adversarial assumption. In Helen, we use a threshold structure where all
parties must participate in order to decrypt a ciphertext.
2.2.2 Zero knowledge proofs
Informally, zero knowledge proofs are proofs that prove that a certain statement is true without revealing
the prover’s secret for this statement. For example, a prover can prove that there is a solution to a Sudoku
puzzle without revealing the actual solution. Zero knowledge proofs of knowledge additionally prove that
the prover indeed knows the secret. Helen uses modified Σ-protocols [26] to prove properties of a party’s
local computation. The main building blocks we use are ciphertext proof of plaintext knowledge, plaintext-
ciphertext multiplication, and ciphertext interval proof of plaintext knowledge [24, 14], as we further explain
in Section 4. Note that Σ-protocols are honest verifier zero knowledge, but can be transformed into full
zero-knowledge using existing techniques [25, 33, 37]. In our paper, we present our protocol using the
Σ-protocol notation.
2.2.3 Malicious MPC
We utilize SPDZ [28], a state-of-the-art malicious MPC protocol, for both Helen and the secure baseline
we evaluate against. Another recent malicious MPC protocol is authenticated garbled circuits [73], which
supports boolean circuits. We decided to use SPDZ for our baseline because the majority of the computation
in SGD is spent doing matrix operations, which is not efficiently represented in boolean circuits. For the rest
of this section we give an overview of the properties of SPDZ.
An input a ∈ Fpk to SPDZ is represented as 〈a〉 = (δ, (a1, . . . , an), (γ(a)1, . . . , γ(a)n)), where ai
is a share of a and γ(a)i is the MAC share authenticating a under a SPDZ global key α. Player i holds
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ai, γ(a)i, and δ is public. During a correct SPDZ execution, the following property must hold: a =
∑
i ai
and α(a + δ) =
∑
i γ(a)i. The global key α is not revealed until the end of the protocol; otherwise the
malicious parties can use α to construct new MACs.
SPDZ has two phases: an offline phase and an online phase. The offline phase is independent of the
function and generates precomputed values that can be used during the online phase, while the online phase
executes the designated function.
2.3 Learning and Convex Optimization
Much of contemporary machine learning can be framed in the context of minimizing the cumulative error (or
loss) of a model over the training data. While there is considerable excitement around deep neural networks,
the vast majority of real-world machine learning applications still rely on robust linear models because
they are well understood and can be efficiently and reliably learned using established convex optimization
procedures.
In this work, we focus on linear models with squared error and various forms of regularization resulting
in the following set of multi-party optimization problems:
wˆ = arg min
w
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖Xiw − yi‖22 + λR(w), (1)
where Xi ∈ Rn×d and yi ∈ Rn are the training data (features and labels) from party i. The regularization func-
tion R and regularization tuning parameter λ are used to improve prediction accuracy on high-dimensional
data. Typically, the regularization function takes one of the following forms:
RL1(w) =
d∑
j=1
|wj |, RL2(w) =
1
2
d∑
j=1
w2j
corresponding to Lasso (L1) and Ridge (L2) regression respectively. The estimated model wˆ ∈ Rd can
then be used to render a new prediction yˆ∗ = wˆTx∗ at a query point x∗. It is worth noting that in some
applications of LASSO (e.g., genomics [29]) the dimension d can be larger than n. However, in this work
we focus on settings where d is smaller than n, and the real datasets and scenarios we use in our evaluation
satisfy this property.
ADMM. Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) [15] is an established technique for
distributed convex optimization. To use ADMM, we first reformulate Eq. 1 by introducing additional
variables and constraints:
minimize:
{wi}mi=1, z
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖Xiwi − yi‖22 + λR(z),
such that: wi = z for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p} (2)
This equivalent formulation splits w into wi for each party i, but still requires that wi be equal to a global
model z. To solve this constrained formulation, we construct an augmented Lagrangian:
L ({wi}mi=1, z,u) =
1
2
m∑
i=1
‖Xiwi − yi‖22 + λR(z)+
ρ
m∑
i=1
uTi (wi − z) +
ρ
2
m∑
i=1
||wi − z||22 , (3)
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where the dual variables ui ∈ Rd capture the mismatch between the model estimated by party i and the global
model z and the augmenting term ρ2
∑m
i=1 ||wi − z||22 adds an additional penalty (scaled by the constant ρ)
for deviating from z.
The ADMM algorithm is a simple iterative dual ascent on the augmented Lagrangian of Eq. (2). On the
kth iteration, each party locally solves this closed-form expression:
wk+1i ←
(
XTi Xi + ρI
)−1 (
XTi yi + ρ
(
zk − uki
))
(4)
and then shares its local model wk+1i and Lagrange multipliers u
k
i to solve for the new global weights:
zk+1 ← arg min
z
λR(z) +
ρ
2
m∑
i=1
||wk+1i − z + uki ||22. (5)
Finally, each party uses the new global weights zk+1 to update its local Lagrange multipliers
uk+1i ← uki + wk+1i − zk+1. (6)
The update equations (4), (5), and (6) are executed iteratively until all updates reach a fixed point. In
practice, a fixed number of iterations may be used as a stopping condition, and that is what we do in Helen.
LASSO. We use LASSO as a running example for the rest of the paper in order to illustrate how our
secure training protocol works. LASSO is a popular regularized linear regression model that uses the
L1 norm as the regularization function. The LASSO formulation is given by the optimization objective
arg minw ‖Xw − y‖22 + λ‖w‖. The boxed section below shows the ADMM training procedure for LASSO.
Here, the quantities in color are quantities that are intermediate values in the computation and need to be
protected from every party, whereas the quantities in black are private values known to one party.
The coopetitive learning task for LASSO
Input of party Pi: Xi,yi
1. Ai ←
(
XTi Xi + ρI
)−1
2. bi ← XTi yi
3. u0, z0,w0 ← 0
4. For k = 0, ADMMIterations-1:
(a) wk+1i ← Ai(bi + ρ
(
zk − uki
)
)
(b) zk+1 ← Sλ/mρ
(
1
m
∑m
i=1
(
wk+1i + u
k
i
))
(c) uk+1i ← uki + wk+1i − zk+1
Sλ/mρ is the soft the soft thresholding operator, where
Sκ(a) =

a− κ a > κ
0 |a| ≤ κ
a+ κ a < −κ
(7)
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Figure 2: Architecture overview of Helen. Every red shape indicates secret information known only to the
indicated party, and black indicates public information visible to everyone (which could be private information
in encrypted form). For participant m, we annotate the meaning of each quantity.
The parameters λ and ρ are public and fixed.
3 System overview
Figure 2 shows the system setup in Helen. A group ofm participants (also called parties) wants to jointly train
a model on their data without sharing the plaintext data. As mentioned in Section 1, the use cases we envision
for our system consist of a few large organizations (around 10 organizations), where each organization has a
lot of data (n is on the order of hundreds of thousands or millions). The number of features/columns in the
dataset d is on the order of tens or hundreds. Hence d n.
We assume that the parties have agreed to publicly release the final model. As part of Helen, they will
engage in an interactive protocol during which they share encrypted data, and only at the end will they
obtain the model in decrypted form. Helen supports regularized linear models including least squares linear
regression, ridge regression, LASSO, and elastic net. In the rest of the paper, we focus on explaining Helen
via LASSO, but we also provide update equations for ridge regression in Section 7.
3.1 Threat model
We assume that all parties have agreed upon a single functionality to compute and have also consented to
releasing the final result of the function to every party.
We consider a strong threat model in which all but one party can be compromised by a malicious
attacker. This means that the compromised parties can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol, such as supplying
inconsistent inputs, substituting their input with another party’s input, or executing different computation
than expected. In the flu prediction example, six divisions could collude together to learn information about
one of the medical divisions. However, as long as the victim medical division follows our protocol correctly,
the other divisions will not be able to learn anything about the victim division other than the final result of the
function. We now state the security theorem.
Theorem 6. Helen securely evaluates an ideal functionality fADMM in the (fcrs, fSPDZ)-hybrid model under
standard cryptographic assumptions, against a malicious adversary who can statically corrupt up to m− 1
out of m parties.
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We formalize the security of Helen in the standalone MPC model. fcrs and fSPDZ are ideal functionalities
that we use in our proofs, where fcrs is the ideal functionality representing the creation of a common reference
string, and fSPDZ is the ideal functionality that makes a call to SPDZ. We present the formal definitions as
well as proofs in Appendix B.2.
Out of scope attacks/complementary directions. Helen does not prevent a malicious party from choosing
a bad dataset for the coopetitive computation (e.g., in an attempt to alter the computation result). In particular,
Helen does not prevent poisoning attacks [48, 19]. MPC protocols generally do not protect against bad
inputs because there is no way to ensure that a party provides true data. Nevertheless, Helen will ensure that
once a party supplies its input into the computation, the party is bound to using the same input consistently
throughout the entire computation; in particular, this prevents a party from providing different inputs at
different stages of the computation, or mix-and-matching inputs from other parties. Further, some additional
constraints can also be placed in pre-processing, training, and post-processing to mitigate such attacks, as we
elaborate in Section 9.2.
Helen also does not protect against attacks launched on the public model, for example, attacks that
attempt to recover the training data from the model itself [69, 17]. The parties are responsible for deciding if
they are willing to share with each other the model. Our goal is only to conduct this computation securely:
to ensure that the parties do not share their raw plaintext datasets with each other, that they do not learn
more information than the resulting model, and that only the specified computation is executed. Investigating
techniques for ensuring that the model does not leak too much about the data is a complementary direction to
Helen, and we expect that many of these techniques could be plugged into a system like Helen. For example,
Helen can be easily combined with some differential privacy tools that add noise before model release to
ensure that the model does not leak too much about an individual record in the training data. We further
discuss possible approaches in Section 9.3.
Finally, Helen does not protect against denial of service – all parties must participate in order to produce
a model.
3.2 Protocol phases
We now explain the protocol phases at a high level. The first phase requires all parties to agree to perform the
coopetitive computation, which happens before initializing Helen. The other phases are run using Helen.
Agreement phase. In this phase, the m parties come together and agree that they are willing to run a certain
learning algorithm (in Helen’s case, ADMM for linear models) over their joint data. The parties should also
agree to release the computed model among themselves.
The following discrete phases are run by Helen. We summarize their purposes here and provide the
technical design for each in the following sections.
Initialization phase. During initialization, the m parties compute the threshold encryption parameters [34]
using a generic maliciously secure MPC protocol like SPDZ [28]. The public output of this protocol is a
public key PK that is known to everyone. Each party also receives a piece (called a share) of the corresponding
secret key SK: party Pi receives the i-th share of the key denoted as [SK]i. A value encrypted under PK can
only be decrypted via all shares of the SK, so every party needs to agree to decrypt this value. Fig. 2 shows
these keys. This phase only needs to run once for the entire training process, and does not need to be re-run
as long as the parties’ configuration does not change.
Input preparation phase. In this phase, each party prepares its data for the coopetitive computation. Each
party Pi precomputes summaries of its data and commits to them by broadcasting encrypted summaries to
all other parties. The parties also need to prove that they know the values inside these encryptions using
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zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. From this moment on, party Pi will not be able to use different inputs
for the rest of the computation.
By default, each party stores the encrypted summaries from other parties. This is a viable solution since
these summaries are much smaller than the data itself. It is possible to also store all m summaries in a public
cloud by having each party produce an integrity MAC of the summary from each other party and checking
the MAC upon retrieval which protects against a compromised cloud.
Model compute phase. This phase follows the iterative ADMM algorithm, in which parties successively
compute locally on encrypted data, followed by a coordination step with other parties using a generic MPC
protocol.
Throughout this protocol, each party receives only encrypted intermediate data. No party learns the
intermediate data because, by definition, an MPC protocol should not reveal any data beyond the final result.
Moreover, each party proves in zero knowledge to the other parties that it performed the local computation
correctly using data that is consistent with the private data that was committed in the input preparation
phase. If any one party misbehaves, the other parties will be able to detect the cheating with overwhelming
probability.
Model release phase. At the end of the model compute phase, all parties obtain an encrypted model. All
parties jointly decrypt the weights and release the final model. However, it is possible for a set of parties
to not receive the final model at the end of training if other parties misbehave (it has been proven that it is
impossible to achieve fairness for generic MPC in the malicious majority setting [20]). Nevertheless, this
kind of malicious behavior is easily detectable in Helen and can be enforced using legal methods.
4 Cryptographic Gadgets
Helen’s design combines several different cryptographic primitives. In order to explain the design clearly,
we split Helen into modular gadgets. In this section and the following sections, we discuss (1) how Helen
implements these gadgets, and (2) how Helen composes them in the overall protocol.
For simplicity, we present our zero knowledge proofs as Σ-protocols, which require the verifier to
generate random challenges. These protocols can be transformed into full zero knowledge with non-malleable
guarantees with existing techniques [37, 33]. We explain one such transformation in Appendix B.2.
4.1 Plaintext-ciphertext matrix multiplication proof
Gadget 1. A zero-knowledge proof for the statement: “Given public parameters: public key PK,
encryptions EX, EY and EZ; private parameters: X,
• DecSK(EZ) = DecSK(EX) · DecSK(EY), and
• I know X such that DecSK(EX) = X.”
Gadget usage. We first explain how Gadget 1 is used in Helen. A party Pi in Helen knows a plaintext X
and commits to X by publishing its encryption, denoted by EncPK(X). Pi also receives an encrypted matrix
EncPK(Y) and needs to compute EncPK(Z) = EncPK(XY) by leveraging the homomorphic properties of
the encryption scheme. Since parties in Helen may be malicious, other parties cannot trust Pi to compute and
output EncPK(Z) correctly. Gadget 1 will help Pi prove in zero-knowledge that it executed the computation
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correctly. The proof needs to be zero-knowledge so that nothing is leaked about the value of X. It also needs
to be a proof of knowledge so that Pi proves that it knows the plaintext matrix X.
Protocol. Using the Paillier ciphertext multiplication proofs [24], we can construct a naı¨ve algorithm for
proving matrix multiplication. For input matrices that are Rl×l, the naı¨ve algorithm will incur a cost of l3
since one has to prove each individual product. One way to reduce this cost is to have the prover prove that
tZ = (tX)Y for a randomly chosen t such that ti = ti mod q (where t is a challenge from the verifier).
For such a randomly chosen t, the chance that the prover can construct a tZ
′
= tXY is exponentially small
(see Theorem 3 for an analysis).
As the first step, both the prover and the verifier apply the reduction to get the new statement EncPK(tZ) =
EncPK(tX)EncPK(Y). To prove this reduced form, we apply the Paillier ciphertext multiplication proof in a
straightforward way. This proof takes as input three ciphertexts: Ea, Eb, Ec. The prover proves that it knows
the plaintext a∗ such that a∗ = DecSK(Ea), and that DecSK(Ec) = DecSK(Ea) · DecSK(Eb). We apply
this proof to every multiplication for each dot product in (tX) ·Y. The prover then releases the individual
encrypted products along with the corresponding ciphertext multiplication proofs. The verifier needs to verify
that EncPK(tZ) = EncPK(tXY). Since the encrypted ciphers from the previous step are encrypted using
Paillier, the verifier can homomorphically add them appropriately to get the encrypted vector EncPK(tXY).
From a dot product perspective, this step will sum up the individual products computed in the previous step.
Finally, the prover needs to prove that each element of tZ is equal to each element of tXY. We can prove
this using the same ciphertext multiplication proof by setting a∗ = 1.
4.2 Plaintext-plaintext matrix multiplication proof
Gadget 2. A zero-knowledge proof for the statement: “Given public parameters: public key PK,
encryptions EX, EY, EZ; private parameters: X and Y,
• DecSK(EZ) = DecSK(EX) · DecSK(EY), and
• I know X, Y, and Z such that DecSK(EX) = X, DecSK(EY) = Y, and DecSK(EZ) = Z.”
Gadget usage. This proof is used to prove matrix multiplication when the prover knows both input matrices
(and thus the output matrix as well). The protocol is similar to the plaintext-ciphertext proofs, except that we
have to do an additional proof of knowledge of Y.
Protocol. The prover wishes to prove to a verifier that Z = XY without revealing X,Y, or Z. We follow
the same protocol as Gadget 1. Additionally, we utilize a variant of the ciphertext multiplication proof
that only contains the proof of knowledge component to show that the prover also knows Y. The proof
of knowledge for the matrix is simply a list of element-wise proofs for Y. We do not explicitly prove the
knowledge of Z because the matrix multiplication proof and the proof of knowledge for Y imply that the
prover knows Z as well.
5 Input preparation phase
5.1 Overview
In this phase, each party prepares data for coopetitive training. In the beginning of the ADMM procedure,
every party precomputes some summaries of its data and commits to them by broadcasting encrypted
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summaries to all the other parties. These summaries are then reused throughout the model compute phase.
Some form of commitment is necessary in the malicious setting because an adversary can deviate from the
protocol by altering its inputs. Therefore, we need a new gadget that allows us to efficiently commit to these
summaries.
More specifically, the ADMM computation reuses two matrices during training: Ai = (XTi Xi + ρI)
−1
and bi = XTi yi from party i (see Section 2.3 for more details). These two matrices are of sizes d × d
and d × 1, respectively. In a semihonest setting, we would trust parties to compute Ai and bi correctly.
In a malicious setting, however, the parties can deviate from the protocol and choose Ai and bi that are
inconsistent with each other (e.g., they do not conform to the above formulations).
Helen does not have any control over what data each party contributes because the parties must be free to
choose their own Xi and yi. However, Helen ensures that each party consistently uses the same Xi and yi
during the entire protocol. Otherwise, malicious parties could try to use different/inconsistent Xi and yi at
different stages of the protocol, and thus manipulate the final outcome of the computation to contain the data
of another party.
One possibility to address this problem is for each party i to commit to its Xi in EncPK(Xi) and yi in
EncPK(yi). To calculate Ai, the party can calculate and prove XTi X using Gadget 2, followed by computing
a matrix inversion computation within SPDZ. The result Ai can be repeatedly used in the iterations. This is
clearly inefficient because (1) the protocol scales linearly in n, which could be very large, and (2) the matrix
inversion computation requires heavy compute.
Our idea is to prove using an alternate formulation via singular value decomposition (SVD) [42], which
can be much more succinct: Ai and bi can be decomposed using SVD to matrices that scale linearly in d.
Proving the properties of Ai and bi using the decomposed matrices is equivalent to proving using Xi and yi.
5.2 Protocol
5.2.1 Decomposition of reused matrices
We first derive an alternate formulation for Xi (denoted as X for the rest of this section). From fundamental
linear algebra concepts we know that every matrix has a corresponding singular value decomposition [42].
More specifically, there exists unitary matrices U and V, and a diagonal matrix Γ such that X = UΓVT ,
where U ∈ Rn×n, Γ ∈ Rn×d, and V ∈ Rd×d. Since X and thus U are real matrices, the decomposition
also guarantees that U and V are orthogonal, meaning that UTU = I and VTV = I. If X is not a square
matrix, then the top part of Γ is a diagonal matrix, which we will call Σ ∈ Rd×d. Σ’s diagonal is a list of
singular values σi. The rest of the Γ matrix are 0’s. If X is a square matrix, then Γ is simply Σ. Finally, the
matrices U and V are orthogonal matrices. Given an orthogonal matrix Q, we have that QQT = QTQ = I.
It turns out that XTX has some interesting properties:
XTX = (UΓVT )TUΓVT
= VΓTUTUΓVT
= VΓTΓVT
= VΣ2VT .
We now show that (XTX + ρI)−1 = VΘVT , where Θ is the diagonal matrix with diagonal values
1
σ2i + ρ
.
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(XTX + ρI)VΘVT = V(Σ2 + ρI)VTVΘVT
= V(Σ2 + ρI)ΘVT
= VVT = I.
Using a similar reasoning, we can also derive that
XTy = VΓTUTy.
5.2.2 Properties after decomposition
The SVD decomposition formulation sets up an alternative way to commit to matrices (XTi Xi + ρI)
−1 and
Xiyi. For the rest of this section, we describe the zero knowledge proofs that every party has to execute.
For simplicity, we focus on one party and use X and y to represent its data, and A and b to represent its
summaries.
During the ADMM computation, matrices A = (XTX + ρI)−1 and b = XTy are repeatedly used to
calculate the intermediate weights. Therefore, each party needs to commit to A and b. With the alternative
formulation, it is no longer necessary to commit to X and y individually. Instead, it suffices to prove that a
party knows V, Θ, Σ (all are in Rd×d) and a vector y∗ = (UTy)[1:d] ∈ Rd×1 such that:
1. A = VΘVT ,
2. b = VΣTy∗,
3. V is an orthogonal matrix, namely, VTV = I, and
4. Θ is a diagonal matrix where the diagonal entries are 1/(σ2i + ρ). σi are the values on the diagonal of Σ
and ρ is a public value.
Note that Γ can be readily derived from Σ by adding rows of zeros. Moreover, both Θ and Σ are diagonal
matrices. Therefore, we only commit to the diagonal entries of Θ and Σ since the rest of the entries are zeros.
The above four statements are sufficient to prove the properties of A and b in the new formulation. The
first two statements simply prove that A and b are indeed decomposed into some matrices V, Θ, Σ, and y∗.
Statement 3) shows that V is an orthogonal matrix, since by definition an orthogonal matrix Q has to satisfy
the equation QTQ = I. However, we allow the prover to choose V. As stated before, the prover would have
been free to choose X and y anyway, so this freedom does not give more power to the prover.
Statement 4) proves that the matrix Θ is a diagonal matrix such that the diagonal values satisfy the form
above. This is sufficient to show that Θ is correct according to some Σ. Again, the prover is free to choose
Σ, which is the same as freely choosing its input X.
Finally, we chose to commit to y∗ instead of committing to U and y separately. Following our logic
above, it seems that we also need to commit to U and prove that it is an orthogonal matrix, similar to what
we did with V. This is not necessary because of an important property of orthogonal matrices: U’s columns
span the vector space Rn. Multiplying Uy, the result is a linear combination of the columns of U. Since we
also allow the prover to pick its y, Uy essentially can be any vector in Rn. Thus, we only have to allow the
prover to commit to the product of U and y. As we can see from the derivation, b = VΓTUy, but since Γ
is simply Σ with rows of zeros, the actual decomposition only needs the first d elements of Uy. Hence, this
allows us to commit to y∗, which is d× 1.
Using our techniques, Helen commits only to matrices of sizes d× d or d× 1, thus removing any scaling
in n (the number of rows in the dataset) in the input preparation phase.
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5.2.3 Proving the initial data summaries
First, each party broadcasts EncPK(V), EncPK(Σ), EncPK(Θ), EncPK(y∗), EncPK(A), and EncPK(b).
To encrypt a matrix, the party simply individually encrypts each entry. The encryption scheme itself also acts
as a commitment scheme [43], so we do not need an extra commitment scheme.
To prove these statements, we also need another primitive called an interval proof. Moreover, since these
matrices act as inputs to the model compute phase, we also need to prove that A and b are within a certain
range (this will be used by Gadget 4, described in Section 6.5). The interval proof we use is from [14], which
is an efficient way of proving that a committed number lies within a certain interval. However, what we want
to prove is that an encrypted number lies within a certain interval. This can be solved by using techniques
from [27], which appends the range proof with a commitment-ciphertext equality proof. This extra proof
proves that, given a commitment and a Paillier ciphertext, both hide the same plaintext value.
To prove the first two statements, we invoke Gadget 1 and Gadget 2. This allows us to prove that the
party knows all of the matrices in question and that they satisfy the relations laid out in those statements.
There are two steps to proving statement 3. The prover will compute EncPK(VTV) and prove it
computed it correctly using Gadget 1 as above. The result should be equal to the encryption of the identity
matrix. However, since we are using fixed point representation for our data, the resulting matrix could be off
from the expected values by some small error. VTV will only be close to I, but not equal to I. Therefore,
we also utilize interval proofs to make sure that VTV is close to I, without explicitly revealing the value of
VTV.
Finally, to prove statement 4, the prover does the following:
1. The prover computes and releases EncPK(Σ2) because the prover knows Σ and proves using Gadget 1
that this computation is done correctly.
2. The prover computes EncPK(Σ2+ρI), which anyone can compute because ρ and I are public. EncPK(Σ2)
and EncPK(ρI) can be multiplied together to get the summation of the plaintext matrices.
3. The prover now computes EncPK(Σ2 + ρI) × EncPK(Θ) and proves this encryption was computed
correctly using Gadget 1.
4. Similar to step 3), the prover ends this step by using interval proofs to prove that this encryption is close
to encryption of the identity matrix.
6 Model compute phase
6.1 Overview
In the model compute phase, all parties use the summaries computed in the input preparation phase and
execute the iterative ADMM training protocol. An encrypted weight vector is generated at the end of this
phase and distributed to all participants. The participants can jointly decrypt this weight vector to get the
plaintext model parameters. This phase executes in three steps: initialization, training (local optimization and
coordination), and model release.
6.2 Initialization
We initialize the weights w0i , z
0, and u0i . There are two popular ways of initializing the weights. The first
way is to set every entry to a random number. The second way is to initialize every entry to zero. In Helen,
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we use the second method because it is easy and works well in practice.
6.3 Local optimization
During ADMM’s local optimization phase, each party takes the current weight vector and iteratively optimizes
the weights based on its own dataset. For LASSO, the update equation is simply wk+1i ← Ai(bi +
ρ
(
zk − uki
)
), where Ai is the matrix (XTi Xi+ρI)
−1 and bi is XTi yi. As we saw from the input preparation
phase description, each party holds encryptions of Ai and bi. Furthermore, given zk and uki (either initialized
or received as results calculated from the previous round), each party can independently calculate wk+1i by
doing plaintext scaling and plaintext-ciphertext matrix multiplication. Since this is done locally, each party
also needs to generate a proof proving that the party calculated wk+1i correctly. We compute the proof for
this step by invoking Gadget 1.
6.4 Coordination using MPC
After the local optimization step, each party holds encrypted weights wk+1i . The next step in the ADMM
iterative optimization is the coordination phase. Since this step contains non-linear functions, we evaluate it
using generic MPC.
6.4.1 Conversion to MPC
First, the encrypted weights need to be converted into an MPC-compatible input. To do so, we formulate
a gadget that converts ciphertext to arithmetic shares. The general idea behind the protocol is inspired by
arithmetic sharing protocols [24, 28].
Gadget 3. For m parties, each party having the public key PK and a share of the secret key SK, given
public ciphertext EncPK(a), convert a into m shares ai ∈ Zp such that a ≡
∑
ai mod p. Each party
Pi receives secret share ai and does not learn the original secret value a.
Gadget usage. Each party uses this gadget to convert EncPK(wi) and EncPK(ui) into input shares and
compute the soft threshold function using MPC (in our case, SPDZ). We denote p as the public modulus used
by SPDZ. Note that all of the computation encrypted by ciphertexts are dong within modulo p.
Protocol. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Each party Pi generates a random value ri ∈ [0, 2|p|+κ] and encrypts it, where κ is a statistical security
parameter. Each party should also generate an interval plaintext proof of knowledge of ri, then publish
EncPK(ri) along with the proofs.
2. Each party Pi takes as input the published {EncPK(rj)}mj=1 and compute the product with EncPK(a).
The result is c = EncPK(a+
∑m
j=1 rj).
3. All parties jointly decrypt c to get plaintext b.
4. Party 0 sets a0 = b− r0 mod p. Every other party sets ai ≡ −ri mod p.
5. Each party publishes EncPK(ai) as well as an interval proof of plaintext knowledge.
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6.4.2 Coordination
The ADMM coordination step takes in wk+1i and u
k
i , and outputs z
k+1. The z update requires computing the
soft-threshold function (a non-linear function), so we express it in MPC. Additionally, since we are doing
fixed point integer arithmetic as well as using a relatively small prime modulus for MPC (256 bits in our
implementation), we need to reduce the scaling factors accumulated on wk+1i during plaintext-ciphertext
matrix multiplication. We currently perform this operation inside MPC as well.
6.4.3 Conversion from MPC
After the MPC computation, each party receives shares of z and its MAC shares, as well as shares of wi and
its MAC shares. It is easy to convert these shares back into encrypted form simply by encrypting the shares,
publishing them, and summing up the encrypted shares. We can also calculate uk+1i this way. Each party
also publishes interval proofs of knowledge for each published encrypted cipher. Finally, in order to verify
that they are indeed valid SPDZ shares (the specific protocol is explained in the next section), each party also
publishes encryptions and interval proofs of all the MACs.
6.5 Model release
6.5.1 MPC conversion verification
Since we are combining two protocols (homomorphic encryption and MPC), an attacker can attempt to alter
the inputs to either protocol by using different or inconsistent attacker-chosen inputs. Therefore, before
releasing the model, the parties must prove that they correctly executed the ciphertext to MPC conversion
(and vice versa). We use another gadget to achieve this.
Gadget 4. Given public parameters: encrypted value EncPK(a), encrypted SPDZ input shares EncPK(bi),
encrypted SPDZ MACs EncPK(ci), and interval proofs of plaintext knowledge, verify that
1. a ≡∑i bi mod p, and
2. bi are valid SPDZ shares and ci’s are valid MACs on bi.
Gadget usage. We apply Gadget 4 to all data that needs to be converted from encrypted ciphers to SPDZ
or vice versa. More specifically, we need to prove that (1) the SPDZ input shares are consistent with
EncPK(w
k+1
i ) that is published from each party, and (2) the SPDZ shares for w
k+1
i and z
k are authenticated
by the MACs.
Protocol. The gadget construction proceeds as follows:
1. Each party verifies that EncPK(a), EncPK(bi) and EncPK(ci) pass the interval proofs of knowledge. For
example, bi and ci need to be within [0, p].
2. Each party homomorphically computes EncPK(
∑
i bi), as well as Ed = EncPK(a−
∑
i bi).
3. Each party randomly chooses ri ∈ [0, 2|a|+|κ|], where κ is again a statistical security parameter, and
publishes EncPK(ri) as well as an interval proof of plaintext knowledge.
4. Each party calculates Ef = Ed
∏
i EncPK(ri)
p = EncPK((a −
∑
i bi) +
∑
i(ri · p)). Here we assume
that log |m|+ |p|+ |a|+ |κ| < |n|.
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5. All parties participate in a joint decryption protocol to decrypt Ef obtaining ef .
6. Every party individually checks to see that ef is a multiple of p. If this is not the case, abort the protocol.
7. The parties release the SPDZ global MAC key α.
8. Each party calculates EncPK(α(
∑
bi + δ)) and EncPK(
∑
ci).
9. Use the same method in steps 2 – 6 to prove that α(
∑
bi + δ) ≡
∑
ci mod p.
The above protocol is a way for parties to verify two things. First, that the SPDZ shares indeed match
with a previously published encrypted value (i.e., Gadget 3 was executed correctly). Second, that the shares
are valid SPDZ shares. The second step is simply verifying the original SPDZ relation among value share,
MAC shares, and the global key.
Note that we cannot verify these relations by simply releasing the plaintext data shares and their MACs
since the data shares correspond to the intermediate weights. Furthermore, the shares need to be equivalent in
modulo p, which is different from the Paillier parameter N . Therefore, we use an alternative protocol to test
modulo equality between two ciphertexts, which is the procedure described above in steps 2 to 6.
Since the encrypted ciphers come with interval proofs of plaintext knowledge, we can assume that
a ∈ [0, l]. If two ciphertexts encrypt plaintexts that are equivalent to each other, they must satisfy that a ≡ b
mod p or a = b+ ηp. Thus, if we take the difference of the two ciphertexts, this difference must be ηp. We
could then run the decryption protocol to test that the difference is indeed a multiple of p.
If a ≡∑i bi mod p, simply releasing the difference could still reveal extra information about the value
of a. Therefore, all parties must each add a random mask to a. In step 3, ri’s are generated independently
by all parties, which means that there must be at least one honest party who is indeed generating a random
number within the range. The resulting plaintext thus statistically hides the true value of a−∑i bi with the
statistical parameter κ. If a 6≡ ∑i bi mod p, then the protocol reveals the difference between a −∑i bi
mod p. This is safe because the only way to reveal a−∑i bi mod p is when an adversary misbehaves and
alters its inputs, and the result is independent from the honest party’s behavior.
6.5.2 Weight vector decryption
Once all SPDZ values are verified, all parties jointly decrypt z. This can be done by first aggregating the
encrypted shares of z into a single ciphertext. After this is done, the parties run the joint decryption protocol
from [34] (without releasing the private keys from every party). The decrypted final weights are released in
plaintext to everyone.
7 Extensions to Other Models
Though we used LASSO as a running example, our techniques can be applied to other linear models like
ordinary least-squares linear regression, ridge regression, and elastic net. Here we show the update rules for
ridge regression, and leave its derivation to the readers.
Ridge regression solves a similar problem as LASSO, except with L2 regularization. Given a dataset
(X,y) where X is the feature matrix and y is the prediction vector, ridge regression optimizes arg minw
1
2
‖Xw−
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y‖22 + λ‖w‖2. The update equations for ridge regression are:
wk+1i = (X
T
i Xi + ρI)
−1(XTi yi + ρ(z
k − uki ))
+ (ρ/2)‖wi − zk + uki ‖22
zk+1 =
ρ
2λ/m+ ρ
(w¯k+1 + u¯k)
uk+1i = u
k
i + x
k+1
i − zk+1
The local update is similar to LASSO, while the coordination update is a linear operation instead of the
soft threshold function. Elastic net, which combines L1 and L2 regularization, can therefore be implemented
by combining the regularization terms from LASSO and ridge regression.
8 Evaluation
We implemented Helen in C++. We utilize the SPDZ library [1], a mature library for maliciously secure
multi-party computation, for both the baseline and Helen. In our implementation, we apply the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic to our zero-knowledge proofs [33]. This technique is commonly used in implementations because it
makes the protocols non-interactive and thus more efficient, but assumes the random oracle model.
We compare Helen’s performance to a maliciously secure baseline that trains using stochastic gradient
descent, similar to SecureML [58]. Since SecureML only supports two parties in the semihonest setting,
we implemented a similar baseline using SPDZ [28]. SecureML had a number of optimizations, but they
were designed for the two-party setting. We did not extend those optimizations to the multi-party setting. We
will refer to SGD implemented in SPDZ as the “secure baseline” (we explain more about the SGD training
process in Section 8.1). Finally, we do not benchmark Helen’s Paillier key setup phase. This can be computed
using SPDZ itself, and it is ran only once (as long as the party configuration does not change).
8.1 Experiment setup
We ran our experiments on EC2 using r4.8xlarge instances. Each machine has 32 cores and 244 GiB of
memory. In order to simulate a wide area network setting, we created EC2 instances in Oregon and Northern
Virginia. The instances are equally split across these two regions. To evaluate Helen’s scalability, we used
synthetic datasets that are constructed by drawing samples from a noisy normal distribution. For these
datasets, we varied both the dimension and the number of parties. To evaluate Helen’s performance against
the secure baseline, we benchmarked both systems on two real world datasets from UCI [30].
Training assumptions. We do not tackle hyperparameter tuning in our work, and also assume that the data
has been normalized before training. We also use a fixed number of rounds (10) for ADMM training, which
we found experimentally using the real world datasets. We found that 10 rounds is often enough for the
training process to converge to a reasonable error rate. Recall that ADMM converges in a small number of
rounds because it iterates on a summary of the entire dataset. In contrast, SGD iteratively scans data from
all parties at least once in order to get an accurate representation of the underlying distributions. This is
especially important when certain features occur rarely in a dataset. Since the dataset is very large, even one
pass already results in many rounds.
MPC configuration. As mentioned earlier, SPDZ has two phases of computation: an offline phase and an
online phase. The offline phase can run independently of the secure function, but the precomputed values
cannot be reused across multiple online phases. The SPDZ library provides several ways of benchmarking
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different offline phases, including MASCOT [50] and Overdrive [51]. We tested both schemes and found
Overdrive to perform better over the wide area network. Since these are for benchmarking purposes only,
we decided to estimate the SPDZ offline phase by dividing the number of triplets needed for a circuit by the
benchmarked throughput. The rest of the evaluation section will use the estimated numbers for all SPDZ
offline computation. Since Helen uses parallelism, we also utilized parallelism in the SPDZ offline generation
by matching the number of threads on each machine to the number of cores available.
On the other hand, the SPDZ online implementation is not parallelized because the API was insufficient to
effectively express parallelism. We note two points. First, while parallelizing the SPDZ library will result in a
faster baseline, Helen also utilizes SPDZ, so any improvement to SPDZ also carries over to Helen. Second, as
shown below, our evaluation shows that Helen still achieves significant performance gains over the baseline
even if the online phase in the secure baseline is infinitely fast.
Finally, the parameters we use for Helen are: 128 bits for the secure baseline’s SPDZ configuration, 256
bits for the Helen SPDZ configuration, and 4096 bits for Helen’s Paillier ciphertext.
8.2 Theoretic performance
Baseline Secure SGD C ·m2 · n · d
Helen SVD decomposition c1 · n · d2
SVD proofs c1 ·m · d2 + c2 · d3
MPC offline c1 ·m2 · d
Model compute c1 ·m2 · d+ c2 · d2 + c3 ·m · d
Table 1: Theoretical scaling (complexity analysis) for SGD baseline and Helen. m is the number of parties, n
is the number of samples per party, d is the dimension.
Table 1 shows the theoretic scaling behavior for SGD and Helen, where m is the number of parties, n
is the number of samples per party, d is the dimension, and C and ci are constants. Note that ci’s are not
necessarily the same across the different rows in the table. We split Helen’s input preparation phase into
three sub-components: SVD (calculated in plaintext), SVD proofs, and MPC offline (since Helen uses SPDZ
during the model compute phase, we also need to run the SPDZ offline phase).
SGD scales linearly in n and d. If the number of samples per party is doubled, the number of iterations is
also doubled. A similar argument goes for d. SGD scales quadratic in m because it first scales linearly in m
due to the behavior of the MPC protocol. If we add more parties to the computation, the number of samples
will also increase, which in turn increases the number of iterations needed to scan the entire dataset.
Helen, on the other hand, scales linearly in n only for the SVD computation. We emphasize that SVD is
very fast because it is executed on plaintext data. The c1 part of the SVD proofs formula scales linearly in m
because each party needs to verify from every other party. It also scales linearly in d2 because each proof
verification requires d2 work. The c2 part of the formula has d3 scaling because our matrices are d× d), and
to calculate a resulting encrypted matrix requires matrix multiplication on two d× d matrices.
The coordination phase from Helen’s model compute phase, as well as the corresponding MPC offline
compute phase, scale quadratic in m because we need to use MPC to re-scale weight vectors from each
party. This cost corresponds to the c1 part of the formula. The model compute phase’s d2 cost (c2 part of
the formula) reflects the matrix multiplication and the proofs. The rest of the MPC conversion proofs scale
linearly in m and d (c3 part of the formula).
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Figure 3: Helen scalability measurements.
Samples per party 2000 4000 6000 8000 10K 40K 100K 200K 400K 800K 1M
sklearn L2 error 8937.01 8928.32 8933.64 8932.97 8929.10 8974.15 8981.24 8984.64 8982.88 8981.11 8980.35
Helen L2 error 8841.33 8839.96 8828.18 8839.56 8837.59 8844.31 8876.00 8901.84 8907.38 8904.11 8900.37
sklearn MAE 57.89 58.07 58.04 58.10 58.05 58.34 58.48 58.55 58.58 58.56 58.57
Helen MAE 57.23 57.44 57.46 57.44 57.47 57.63 58.25 58.38 58.36 58.37 58.40
Table 2: Select errors for gas sensor (due to space), comparing Helen with a baseline that uses sklearn to train
on all plaintext data. L2 error is the squared norm; MAE is the mean average error. Errors are calculated after
post-processing.
Samples per party 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10K 20K 40K 60K 80K 100K
sklearn L2 error 92.43 91.67 90.98 90.9 90.76 90.72 90.63 90.57 90.55 90.56 90.55
Helen L2 error 93.68 91.8 91.01 90.91 90.72 90.73 90.67 90.57 90.54 90.57 90.55
sklearn MAE 6.86 6.81 6.77 6.78 6.79 6.81 6.80 6.79 6.79 6.80 6.80
Helen MAE 6.92 6.82 6.77 6.78 6.79 6.81 6.80 6.79 6.80 6.80 6.80
Table 3: Errors for song prediction, comparing Helen with a baseline that uses sklearn to train on all plaintext
data. L2 error is the squared norm; MAE is the mean average error. Errors are calculated after post-processing.
8.3 Synthetic datasets
We want to answer two questions about Helen’s scalability using synthetic datasets: how does Helen scale as
we vary the number of features and how does it scale as we vary the number of parties? Note that we are not
varying the number of input samples because that will be explored in Section 8.4 in comparison to the secure
SGD baseline.
Fig. 3a shows a breakdown of Helen’s cryptographic computation as we scale the number of dimensions.
The plaintext SVD computation is not included in the graph. The SVD proofs phase is dominated by the
matrix multiplication proofs, which scales in d2. The MPC offline phase and the model compute phase are
both dominated by the linear scaling in d, which corresponds to the MPC conversion proofs.
Fig. 3b shows the same three phases as we increase the number of parties. The SVD proofs phase scales
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Figure 4: Helen and baseline performance on the gas sensor data. The gas sensor data contained over 4
million data points; we partitioned into 4 partitions with varying number of sample points per partition to
simulate the varying number of samples per party. The number of parties is 4, and the number of dimensions
is 16.
linearly in the number of parties m. The MPC offline phase scales quadratic in m, but its effects are not very
visible for a small number of parties. The model compute phase is dominated by the linear scaling in m
because the quadratic scaling factor isn’t very visible for a small number of parties.
Finally, we also ran a microbenchmark to understand Helen’s network and compute costs. The experiment
used 4 servers and a synthetic dataset with 50 features and 100K samples per party. We found that the network
costs account for approximately 2% of the input preparation phase and 22% of Helen’s model compute phase.
8.4 Real world datasets
We evaluate on two different real world datasets: gas sensor data [30] and the million song dataset [9, 30].
The gas sensor dataset records 16 sensor readings when mixing two types of gases. Since the two gases are
mixed with random concentration levels, the two regression variables are independent and we can simply
run two different regression problems (one for each gas type). For the purpose of benchmarking, we ran an
experiment using the ethylene data in the first dataset. The million song dataset is used for predicting a song’s
published year using 90 features. Since regression problems produce real values, the year can be calculated
by rounding the regressed value.
For SGD, we set the batch size to be the same size as the dimension of the dataset. The number of
iterations is equal to the total number of sample points divided by the batch size. Unfortunately, we had to
extrapolate the runtimes for a majority of the baseline online phases because the circuits were too big to
compile on our EC2 instances.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 compare Helen to the baseline on the two datasets. Note that Helen’s input preparation
graph combines the three phases that are run during the offline: plaintext SVD computation, SVD proofs, and
MPC offline generation. We can see that Helen’s input preparation phase scales very slowly with the number
of samples. The scaling actually comes from the plaintext SVD calculation because both the SVD proofs and
the MPC offline generation do not scale with the number of samples. Helen’s model compute phase also
stays constant because we fixed the number of iterations to a conservative estimate. SGD, on the other hand,
does scale linearly with the number of samples in both the offline and the online phases.
For the gas sensor dataset, Helen’s total runtime (input preparation plus model compute) is able to achieve
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Figure 5: Helen and baseline performance on the song prediction data, as we vary the number of samples per
party. The number of parties is 4, and the number of dimensions is 90.
Figure 6: Helen comparison with SGD
a 21.5x performance gain over the baseline’s total runtime (offline plus online) when the number of samples is
1000. When the number of samples per party reaches 1 million, Helen is able to improve over the baseline by
20689x. For the song prediction dataset, Helen is able to have a 9.1x performance gain over the baseline when
the number of samples is 1000. When the number of samples per party reaches 100K, Helen improves over
the baseline by 911x. Even if we compare Helen to the baseline’s offline phase only, we find that Helen still
has close to constant scaling while the baseline scales linearly with the number of samples. The performance
improvement compared to the baseline offline phase is up to 1540x for the gas sensor dataset and up to 98x
for the song prediction dataset.
In Table 2 and Table 3, we evaluate Helen’s test errors on the two datasets. We compare the L2 and mean
average error for Helen to the errors obtained from a model trained using sklearn (a standard Python library
for machine learning) on the plaintext data. We did not directly use the SGD baseline because its online
phase does not compile for larger instances, and using sklearn on the plaintext data is a conservative estimate.
We can see that Helen achieves similar errors compared to the sklearn baseline.
9 Related work
We organize the related work section into related coopetitive systems and attacks.
9.1 Coopetitive systems
Coopetitive training systems. In Fig. 7, we compare Helen to prior coopetitive training systems [60, 45,
38, 21, 39, 5, 58, 70]. The main takeaway is that, excluding generic maliciously secure MPC, prior training
systems do not provide malicious security. Furthermore, most of them also assume that the training process
requires outsourcing to two non-colluding servers. At the same time, and as a result of choosing a weaker
security model, some of these systems provide richer functionality than Helen, such as support for neural
networks. As part of our future work, we are exploring how to apply Helen’s techniques to logistic regression
and neural networks.
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Work Functionality n-party? Malicious secu-
rity?
Practical?
Nikolaenko et al. [60] ridge regression no no –
Hall et al. [45] linear regression yes no –
Gascon et al. [38] linear regression no no –
Cock et al. [21] linear regression no no –
Giacomelli et al. [39] ridge regression no no –
Alexandru et al. [5] quadratic opt. no no –
SecureML [58] linear, logistic,
deep learning
no no –
Shokri&Shmatikov [70] deep learning not MPC
(heuristic)
no –
Semi-honest MPC [7] any function yes no –
Malicious MPC [28, 41, 11,
2]
any function yes yes no
Our proposal, Helen: regularized linear models yes yes yes
Figure 7: Insufficiency of existing cryptographic approaches. “n-party” refers to whether the n(>2)
organizations can perform the computation with equal trust (thus not including the two non-colluding servers
model). We answer the practicality question only for maliciously-secure systems. We note that a few works
that we marked as not coopetitive and not maliciously secure discuss at a high level how one might extend
their work to such a setting, but they did not flesh out designs or evaluate their proposals.
Other coopetitive systems. Other than coopetitive training systems, there are prior works on building
coopetitive systems for applications like machine learning prediction and SQL analytics. Coopetitive
prediction systems [13, 66, 64, 55, 40, 49] typically consist of two parties, where one party holds a model
and the other party holds an input. The two parties jointly compute a prediction without revealing the input
or the model to the other party. Coopetitive analytics systems [6, 59, 12, 22, 10] allow multiple parties to
run SQL queries over all parties’ data. These computation frameworks do not directly translate to Helen’s
training workloads. Most of these works also do not address the malicious setting. Recent work has also
explored secure learning and analytics using separate compute nodes and blockchains [36, 35]. The setup is
different from that of Helen where we assume that the data providers are malicious and are also performing
and verifying the computation.
Trusted hardware based systems. The related work presented in the previous two sections all utilize
purely software based solutions. Another possible approach is to use trusted hardware [57, 23], and there are
various secure distributed systems that could be extended to the coopetitive setting [68, 46, 75]. However,
these hardware mechanisms require additional trust and are prone to side-channel leakages [53, 72, 54].
9.2 Attacks on machine learning
Machine learning attacks can be categorized into data poisoning, model leakage, parameter stealing, and
adversarial learning. As mentioned in §3.1, Helen tackles the problem of cryptographically running the
training algorithm without sharing datasets amongst the parties involved, while defenses against these attacks
are orthogonal and complementary to our goal in this paper. Often, these machine learning attacks can be
separately addressed outside of Helen. We briefly discuss two relevant attacks related to the training stage
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and some methods for mitigating them.
Poisoning. Data poisoning allows an attacker to inject poisoned inputs into a dataset before training [48, 19].
Generally, malicious MPC does not prevent an attacker from choosing incorrect initial inputs because there is
no way to enforce this requirement. Nevertheless, there are some ways of mitigating arbitrary poisoning of
data that would complement Helen’s training approach. Before training, one can check that the inputs are
confined within certain intervals. The training process itself can also execute cross validation, a process that
can identify parties that do not contribute useful data. After training, it is possible to further post process the
model via techniques like fine tuning and parameter pruning [56].
Model leakage. Model leakage [69, 17] is an attack launched by an adversary who tries to infer information
about the training data from the model itself. Again, malicious MPC does not prevent an attacker from
learning the final result. In our coopetitive model, we also assume that all parties want to cooperate and have
agreed to release the final model to everyone.
9.3 Differential privacy
One way to alleviate model leakage is through the use of differential privacy [47, 4, 32]. For example, one
way to add differential privacy is to add carefully chosen noise directly to the output model [47]. Each party’s
noise can be chosen directly using MPC, and the final result can then be added to the final model before
releasing. In Helen, differential privacy would be added after the model is computed, but before the model
release phase. However, there are more complex techniques for differential privacy that involve modification
to the training algorithm, and integrating this into Helen is an interesting future direction to explore.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Helen, a coopetitive system for training linear models. Compared to prior work,
Helen assumes a stronger threat model by defending against malicious participants. This means that each
party only needs to trust itself. Compared to a baseline implemented with a state-of-the-art malicious
framework, Helen is able to achieve up to five orders of magnitude of performance improvement. Given the
lack of efficient maliciously secure training protocols, we hope that our work on Helen will lead to further
work on efficient systems with such strong security guarantees.
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A ADMM derivations
Ridge regression solves a similar problem as LASSO, except with L2 regularization. Given dataset (X,y)
where X is the feature matrix and y is the prediction vector, ridge regression optimizes arg minw
1
2
‖Xw −
y‖22 + λ‖w‖2. Splitting the weights into w and z, we have
minimize
1
2
‖Xw − y‖22 + λ‖z‖2
subject to w − z = 0
We first find the augmented Lagrangian
L(w, z,v) =
1
2
‖Xw − y‖22 + λ‖z‖2
+ vT (w − z) + ρ
2
‖w − z‖22
where w and z are the primal weight vectors, and v is the dual weight vector. To simply the equations, we
replace v with the scaled dual variable u where u = (1/ρ)v. The update equations come out to
wk+1 = arg min
w
1
2
‖Xw − y‖22 + (ρ/2)‖w − zk + uk‖22)
zk+1 = arg min
z
λ‖z‖22 + (ρ/2)(wk+1 + z + uk)
uk+1 = uk + wk+1 + zk+1
Since our loss function is decomposable based on data blocks, we can apply the generic global variable
consensus ADMM algorithm and find
wk+1i = arg min
wi
1
2
‖Xiw − y‖22 + (ρ/2)‖wi − zk + uk‖22)
zk+1 = arg min
z
λ‖z‖22 + (mρ/2)‖z− w¯k+1 − u¯k‖22
uk+1 = uk + wk+1 − zk+1
Thus, the w update is
wk+1i = (X
T
i Xi + ρI)
−1(XTi yi + ρ(z
k − uki ))
+ (ρ/2)‖wi − zk + uki ‖22
zk+1 =
ρ
2λ/m+ ρ
(w¯k+1 + u¯k)
uk+1i = u
k
i + x
k+1
i − zk+1
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Therefore, the wi update is the same as LASSO and can be computed using the same techniques. The z
update is actually linear and does not require comparisons, though MPC is still required for reducing the
scaling factors accumulated during fixed point integer multiplications.
B Security proofs
B.1 Definitions
We first define the MPC model. The full definitions are taken from [24, 16], so please refer to those papers
for more details.
Real world model. Let pi be an n-party protocol. The protocol is executed on an open broadcast network
with static, active, and rushing adversary A (rushing means that the adversaries can send their messages after
seeing all of the honest parties’ messages). The number of adversaries can be a majority of the participants.
Let κ be the security parameter. Each party Pi has public input x
p
i and secret input x
s
i , as well as public
output ypi and secret output y
s
i . The adversary A receives the public input and output of all parties.
Let x = (xs1, x
p
1, . . . , x
s
n, x
p
n) be the parties’ input, and let r = (r1, . . . , rn, rA) be the parties’ and the
adversary’s private input randomness. Let C ⊂ M be the corrupted parties, and let a ∈ {0, 1}∗ be the
adversary’s auxiliary input. Let H ⊂M be the honest parties. Therefore, we have that H + C = M .
By ADVRpi,A(κ,x, C, a, r) and EXECpi,A(κ,x, C, a, r)i we denote the output of the adversary A and
the output of party Pi, respectively, after a real world execution of pi with the given input under attack from
A. Let
EXECpi,A(κ,x, C, a, r) =(ADVRpi,A(k,x, C, a, r), (8)
EXECpi,A(κ,x, C, a, r)1, (9)
. . . , (10)
EXECpi,A(κ,x, C, a, r)n) (11)
This is simply the union of the different parties’ and the adversary’s real world output distribution. Denote by
EXECpi,A(κ,x, C, a) the random variable EXECpi,A(k,x, C, a, r), where r is chosen uniformly random. We
define the distribution ensemble with security parameter κ and index (x, C, a) by
EXECpi,A = {EXECpi,A(κ,x, C, a, r)i}κ∈M,x∈({0,1}∗)2n,a∈{0,1}∗,i∈H (12)
Ideal world model. Let f : M×({0, 1}∗)2n×{0, 1}∗ → ({0, 1}∗)2n be a probabilistic n-party function com-
putable in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT). The inputs and outputs are defined as (ys1, y
p
1 , . . . , y
s
n, y
p
n)←
f(κ, xs1, x
p
1, . . . , x
s
n, x
p
n, r), where κ is the security parameter and r is the random input. In the ideal world,
the parties send their inputs to a trusted third party T that chooses a uniformly random r, computes f on
these inputs and returns (ysi , y
p
i ) to Pi.
The active static ideal world adversary AI sees all x
p
i values, as well as x
s
i for all corrupted parties. The
adversary then substitutes the values (xsi , x
p
i ) for the corrupted parties by values of his choice (x
s′
i , x
p′
i ). We set
(xs
′
i , x
p′
i ) = (x
s
i , x
p
i ) for the honest parties. The ideal function f is evaluated on (κ, x
s′
1 , x
p′
1 , . . . , x
s′
n , x
p′
n , r)
via an oracle call. Each party receives output (ysi , y
p
i ), and the adversary sees y
p
i for all parties as well as y
s
i
for all corrupted parties.
Similar to the real world execution, we define ADVRpi,Ai(κ,x, C, a, r) and IDEALpi,Ai(κ,x, C, a, r)i we
denote the output of the adversary Ai and the output of party Pi, respectively, after an ideal world execution
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with the given input under attack from Ai. Let
IDEALf,AI (κ,x, C, a, r) = (ADVRf,AI (κ,x, C, a, r), (13)
IDEALf,AI (κ,x, C, a, r)1, (14)
IDEALf,AI (κ,x, C, a, r)2, (15)
. . . , (16)
IDEALf,AI (κ,x, C, a, r)n) (17)
denote the collective output distribution of the parties and the adversary. Define a distribution ensemble by
IDEALf,AI = {IDEALf,AI (κ,x, C, a)i}κ∈N,x∈({0,1}∗)2n,a∈{0,1}∗,i∈H (18)
Hybrid model. In the (g1, . . . , gl)-hybrid model, the execution of a protocol pi proceeds in the real-life
model, except that the parties have access to a trusted party T for evaluating the n-party functions g1, . . . , gl.
These ideal evaluations proceed as in the ideal world model. The distribution ensemble is
EXECg1,...,glpi,A = {EXECg1,...,glpi,A (κ,x, C, a)i}κ∈N,x∈({0,1}∗)2n,a∈{0,1}∗,i∈H (19)
Security can be defined by requiring a real world execution or a (g1, . . . , gl)-hybrid execution of a
protocol pi for computing an ideal functionality f to reveal no more information to an adversary than does an
ideal execution of f . We can define the real world model by the ()-hybrid model.
Definition 1. Let f be an n-party function, let pi be an n-party protocol We say that pi securely evaluates f
in the (g1, . . . , gl)-hybrid model if for any active static (g1, . . . , gl)-hybrid adversary A, which corrupts only
subsets of C, there exists a static active ideal-model adversary S such that IDEALf,S ≈c EXECg1,...,glpi,A .
Finally, we utilize the modular composition operation that was defined in [16]. The modular composition
theorem (informally) states that if pi Γ-securely evaluates f in the (g1, . . . , gl)-hybrid model and pigi Γ-
securely evaluates gi in the (g1, . . . , gi−1, gi+1, . . . , gl)-hybrid model, then the protocol pi
′
, which follows
protocol pi except with oracle calls to gi replaced by executions of the protocol pigi , Γ-securely evaluates f in
the (g1, . . . , gi−1, gi+1, . . . , gl)-hybrid model.
Next, we describe some essential lemmas and existing protocols that we use.
Theorem 1 (Schwartz-Zippel). Let P ∈ F [x1, x2, . . . , xn] be a non-zero polynomial of total degree d > 0
over a field F . Let S be a finite subset of F and let r1, r2, . . . , rn be selected at random independently and
uniformly from S. Then Pr[P (r1, r2, . . . , rn) = 0] ≤ d|S| .
Lemma 1 (Smudging lemma). LetB1 = B1(κ), andB2 = B2(κ) be positive integers and let 1 ∈ [−B1, B1]
be a fixed integer. Let e2 ∈R [−B2, B2] be chosen uniformly at random. Then, the distribution of e2 is
statistically indistinguishable from that of e2 + e1 as long as B1/B2 = neg(κ).
Lemma 1 is used for arguing statistical indistinguishability between two distributions.
Next, we list three existing zero-knowledge proofs that serve as building blocks in our system. They are
all Σ protocols [26], which assume that the verifier is honest. However, they can be transformed into full zero
knowledge, as we explain in detail later. Since this is taken from existing literature, we will not re-derive the
simulators here, and instead assume access to simulators for all three protocols.
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Protocol 1 (Paillier proof of plaintext knowledge). A protocol for proving plaintext knowledge of a Paillier
ciphertext EncPK(a) [24].
Protocol 2 (Paillier multiplication proof). A protocol for: given EncPK(α),EncPK(a),EncPK(b), prove that
EncPK(b) indeed encrypts α · a and that the prover has plaintext knowledge of EncPK(α) [24].
Protocol 3 (Encryption interval proof). An efficient interval proof that proves an encrypted value lies within
an interval.
Note that in order to construct Protocol 3, we combine two existing protocols together. The first protocol
is an interval proof for a committed value [14]. The second protocol is an additional proof that proves the
equality of plaintexts under a commitment and an encryption [27].
To turn our honest verifier proofs into full zero knowledge (as well as non-malleable and concurrent), we
utilize an existing transformation [37]. Informally, the transformation does two things. First, the random
challenge in a Σ protocol is first generated by the verifier giving a challenge, then the prover proves an OR
protocol given this challenge. The OR protocol consists of the actual statement to be proved, plus a signature
proof. A simulator can simply simulate the second protocol in the OR protocol, instead of the main proof.
Second, the witness for the proof is extracted via encrypting it under a public key generated from the common
reference string. During the simulation, the simulator is able to generate the encryption key parameters, and
can thus decrypt the encryption and extract an adversary’s input. This means no rewinding is needed either
for simulation or extraction. We denote the parameter generation functionality as fcrs. In Helen’s design,
we transform a Σ protocol S using this method, then use the simulator Szk(S) and extractor Ezk(S) in our
proofs for simulation and extraction of the adversary’s secrets.
Finally, we assume that we have access to a threshold encryption scheme that can provably decrypt
a ciphertext for our threshold structure. The scheme is described in [34], and we do not provide further
proofs for this protocol. In our MPC simulation, we assume that we have a simulator Sdec for the decryption
protocol.
B.2 Proofs
Theorem 2. Protocol described in Section 4.1 is an honest verifier zero knowledge proof of plaintext
knowledge for a committed matrix EncPK(X).
Proof sketch. The Paillier ciphertext proof of plaintext knowledge is a Σ protocol. Correctness, soundness,
and simulation arguments are given in [24]. Using Szk and Ezk, we can achieve full zero knowledge in the
concurrent setting by simply proving knowledge for each element in the matrix using the ciphertext proof of
plaintext knowledge.
Theorem 3. Gadget 1, with applied transformation from [37], is a zero knowledge argument for proving
the following: given a public committed EncPK(X), an encrypted EncPK(Y), and EncPK(Z) prove that the
prover knows X and that Z = XY under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Proof sketch. To prove this theorem, we first prove the security of the honest verifier version of this protocol.
The argument itself contains several parts. The first is a proof of plaintext knowledge of the matrix X, which
is applied straightforwardly from Theorem 2. This allows us to extract the content of the commitment. The
second is a matrix multiplication proof, which consists of a reduction and ciphertext multiplication proofs.
Completeness is straightforward to see since we simply follow the computation of matrix multiplication,
except that Y is encrypted. If EncPK(Z) = XEncPK(Y), then tEncPK(Z) = tXEncPK(Y). Soundness
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can be proved in two steps. The first step utilizes the Schwartz-Zippel lemma Theorem 1. Given a random
vector t ∈ [0, 2l] where l = |n|−2|p|− logM , we will verify that tZ = tXY. This step reduces the problem
to verifying matrix-vector multiplication instead of matrix-matrix multiplication. Using the lemma, we can
view this as a multivariable polynomial equality testing problem. Therefore, an inequality will correctly
pass with probability d/|S|. Since the commitments to X, Y, and Z are homomorphic, the prover and the
verifier can calculate EncPK(tX) and EncPK(tZ) independently. The second step of the soundness argument
comes from the fact that after this transformation, we execute individual ciphertext multiplication proofs,
which are Σ protocols themselves. These Σ-protocols are used for the individual products of a dot product
(these are proved independently), as well as for proving the summation of these individual products. The
summation itself can be computed by the verifier directly via the homomorphic properties of the ciphertexts.
Then the summation proof is another Σ-protocol. Σ-protocols satisfy the special soundness property [26],
which means that a cheating verifier can cheat with probability 2−t, where t indicates the length of the
challenge. Therefore, the probability of cheating is overall negligible via union bound. To simulate the matrix
multiplication proofs, we first use the randomness on the verifier input tape to construct t. Assuming that
the simulator for Protocol 2 is Smult, we then use the challenges for the ciphertext multiplication protocols
and feed each into the simulator Smult that simulates the Σ-protocol for ciphertext multiplication. Finally, to
make this entire argument full zero knowledge, we apply the protocol transformation from [37].
Theorem 4. Gadget 2, with applied transformation from [37], is a zero knowledge argument for proving the
following: given committed matrices EncPK(X), EncPK(Y), and EncPK(Z), prove that XY = Z and that
the prover knows the committed values X and Y under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Proof sketch. The proof is a straightforward combination of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. Gadget 3 has a simulator Sa such that Sa’s distribution is statistically indistinguishable from
Gadget 3’s real world execution.
Proof sketch. First, we must construct such a simulator Sa. To do so, we modify a similar simulator from [24].
Let M denote all of the parties in the protocol. The simulator runs the following:
1. Let s be the smallest index of an honest party and let H
′
be the set of the remaining honest parties. For
each honest party in H
′
, generate ri and EncPK(ri) correctly. For party s, choose r
′
s uniformly random
from [0, 2|p|+κ], and let EncPK(rs) = EncPK(r
′
s − a).
2. Hand the values EncPK(ri)i∈H to the adversary and receive from the adversary EncPK(ri).
3. Run the augmented proofs of knowledge (Szk(Ppok)) from the adversaries and simulate the proof for party
s (since the simulator does not know the plaintext value of rs). If any proof fails from the adversary, abort.
Otherwise, continue and use the augmented extractor (Ezk(Ppok))to extract the adversary’s inputs ri.
4. Compute e =
∑
i 6=s(ri) + r
′
s =
∑
i ri + a.
5. Simulate a call to decrypt using Sdec. Note that the decrypted value is exactly e due to the relation
described in the previous step.
6. Simulator computes the shares as indicated in the original protocol except for party s, which sets its value
to a
′
s = (as − a) mod p.
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We now prove that the simulator’s distribution is statistically indistinguishable from the real world
execution’s distribution.
Note that other than EncPK(rs), the rest of Sa’s simulation follows exactly from the real world execution
A, and thus is distributed exactly the same as the execution.
In simulation step 1, EncPK(rs) encrypts rs. Given a plaintext that is within [0, p), using Lemma 1 we
know that rs and r
′
s are statistically indistinguishable from each other. This means that both rs’s and r
′
s’s
distributions are statistically close to being uniformly drawn from the interval [0, 2|p|+κ]. Since we always
blind encryptions, this means that EncPK(rs) is a random encryption of a statistically indistinguishable uni-
formly random element from [0, 2|p|+κ]. Therefore, EncPK(ds)’s distribution in the simulator is statistically
indistinguishable from the corresponding distribution in the execution.
The distributions of the real world proofs and the simulated proofs follow straightforwardly from [37].
Finally, we know that a
′
s = as − a mod p. The real world execution’s share is as. Since rs and r
′
s are
statistically indistinguishable from the uniformly random distribution and a < p, the rs’s and r
′
s’s distributions
after applying modulo p are also statistically indistinguishable. Therefore, the a
′
s and as distributions are also
statistically indistinguishable.
Next, we first define fcrs and fSPDZ , two ideal functionalities.
1. fcrs: an ideal functionality that generates a common reference string, as well as secret inputs to the parties.
As mentioned before, this functionality is used for the augmented proofs so that the extractor can extract
the adversary’s inputs by simple decryption.
2. fSPDZ: an ideal functionality that computes the ADMM consensus phase using SPDZ.
Theorem 6. fADMM in the (fcrs, fSPDZ)-hybrid model under standard cryptographic assumptions, against a
malicious adversary who can statically corrupt up to m− 1 out of m parties.
Proof sketch. To prove Helen’s security, we first start the proof by constructing a simulator for Helen’s
two phases: input preparation and model compute. Next, we prove that the simulator’s distribution is
indistinguishable from the real world execution’s distribution. Thus, we prove security in the (fcrs, fSPDZ)-
hybrid model.
First, we construct a simulator S that first simulates the input preparation phase, followed by the model
compute phase.
1. S simulates fcrs by generating the public key PKcrs and a corresponding secret key SKcrs. These parameters
are used for the interactive proof transformations so that we are able to extract the secrets from the proofs
of knowledge.
2. S next generates the threshold encryption parameters. The public key PK is handed to every party. The
secret key shares [SK]i are handed to each party as well. Discard [SK]i for the honest parties.
3. Next, S starts simulating the input preparation phase. It receives matrix inputs, as well as interval proofs
of knowledge from the adversaryA. It also generates dummy inputs for the honest parties, e.g., encrypting
vectors and matrices of 0.
4. If the proofs of knowledge from A pass, then S extracts the inputs using the augmented extractors
from Theorem 2. Otherwise, abort.
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5. S hands the inputs from the adversary to the ideal functionality fADMM, which will output the final weights
wfinal to the simulator.
6. The first two steps in the input preparation phase utilize matrix plaintext multiplication proofs. For each
honest party, S simply proves using its dummy inputs and simulates the appropriate proofs. S should also
receive proofs from the adversary. If the proofs pass, continue. Otherwise, abort the simulation.
7. The simulator continues to step 3 of the input preparation phase. This step has two different proofs. The
first proof is a matrix multiplication proof between VT and V. This can be simulated like the previous
steps. The next step is an element-wise interval proof with respect to the identity matrix. The simulator
can again simulate this step using the simulator for the interval proof. Next, S verifies the proofs from the
malicious parties. If the proofs pass, move on. Otherwise, abort the simulation.
8. Something similar can be done to prove and verify the step 4 of input preparation phase from each party,
since the proofs utilized are similar to those used in step 3.
9. S now begins simulating the model compute phase.
10. Initialize the encrypted weights (w, z,u) to be the zero vector.
11. for i in admm iters:
(a) The first step in the iteration is the local compute phase. S simulates the honest parties by correctly
executing the matrix multiplications using the dummy input matrices and the encrypted weight and
produces both the encrypted results and the multiplication proofs from Protocol 2. S also receives
a set of encrypted results and multiplication proofs from the adversary for the corrupted parties. S
can verify that A has indeed executed the matrix multiplication proofs correctly. If any of the proofs
doesn’t pass, the simulator aborts. If not all of the ciphertexts are distinct, the simulator also aborts.
(b) Now, S needs to simulate the additive sharing protocol for each party. This can be done by invoking
the simulator from Theorem 5.
(c) After the secret sharing process is complete, all parties need to publish encryptions of their secret
shares. S publishes encryptions of these shares for the honest parties and the appropriate interval
proofs of knowledge. The malicious parties also publish encrypted shares and their interval proofs
of knowledge. If the interval proofs of knowledge do not pass for the adversary, then abort the
computation. Otherwise, S extracts all of the encrypted shares from the adversary. Here, S also
calculates the expected shares from the adversary. This can be calculated because S knows the
randomness ri’s used by A.
(d) S needs to now simulate a call to the fSPDZ oracle. The simulator first picks a random α ∈ Zp,
which serves as the global MAC key. Then it splits α into random shares and gives one share
to each party. If S is generating shares for the input values, it will simply generate MACs γ(a)i
for the shares it receives from running Sa. Otherwise, S then generates random SPDZ shares and
MAC shares γ(a)i. In both cases, the values shares and the MAC shares satisfy the SPDZ invariant:
α(
∑
i ai)− (
∑
i γ(a)i).
(e) Each party publishes encryptions of all SPDZ input and output shares, as well as their MAC shares.
The simulator S will simulate the honest parties’ output by releasing those encryptions and interval
proofs of knowledge. S also receives the appropriate encryptions and interval proofs of knowledge
from the adversary. Run the extractor to extract the contents of the adversary. Again, keep track of
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the shares distributed to the adversary, as well as the extracted shares that were committed by the
adversary.
(f) If the iteration is the last iteration, then S simulates a call to SPDZ by splitting the wfinal shares into
random shares, as well as creating the corresponding MAC shares to satisfy the relation with the
global key α.
12. After the iterations, S needs to simulate the MPC checks described in Section 6.5, where we need to
prove modular equality for a set of encrypted values and shares. S runs the following in parallel, for each
equality equation that needs to be proven:
• In the original protocol, we have EncPK(a),EncPK(bi),EncPK(ci) where we want to prove that a ≡∑
i bi mod p and α(
∑
i bi) ≡
∑
i ci mod p. First, S simulates the proof of the first equality. S
follows the protocol by verifying the interval proofs of knowledge from every party. If a malicious
party’s proof fails, then abort.
• S computes the cipher EncPK(a−
∑
i bi) by directly operating on the known ciphertexts.
• S follows the protocol described in Section 6.5 by following the protocol exactly. S picks random si’s
and generates interval proofs of knowledge. S also receives EncPK(si) from the adversary and the
corresponding interval proofs of knowledge. Extract the EncPK(si) values from the adversary if the
proofs are verified.
• Before S releases the decrypted value, it needs to know what value to release. To do so, S needs to
compare an encrypted value a and its secret shares bi (each party Pi retains bi). We want to make sure
that a ≡∑i bi mod p. While the simulator does not know a, it does know some information when
a was first split into shares. More specifically, S knows the adversary’s generated randomness during
the additive secret sharing, the decrypted number e, as well as the shares committed by the adversary.
The equation a+
∑
i ri ≡ e mod p holds because everyone multiplies the published EncPK(ri) with
EncPK(a) to get EncPK(a+
∑
i ri), and the decryption process is simulated and verified. This means
that a ≡ e −∑i ri mod p. Let’s assume that an adversary alters one of its input shares bj to b′j for
parties in set A. Then the difference between a and the bi shares is simply
a−
∑
i 6⊂A
bi −
∑
i⊂A
b
′
i mod p ≡ e−
∑
i
ri −
∑
i 6⊂A
bi −
∑
i⊂A
b
′
i mod p
≡ (e− r0) +
∑
i 6=0
(−ri)−
∑
i 6⊂A
bi −
∑
i⊂A
b
′
i mod p
≡ b0 +
∑
i 6=0
bi −
∑
i 6⊂A
bi −
∑
i⊂A
b
′
i mod p
≡
∑
i
bi −
∑
i 6⊂A
bi −
∑
i⊂A
b
′
i mod p
≡
∑
i⊂A
(bi − b′i) mod p
Hence, the difference modulo p is simply the the difference in the changes in the adversary’s shares, and
is completely independent from the honest parties’ values. Let this value be v.
• The next step is simple: S simply simulates Sdec and releases the value v +
∑
i(sip).
• S can follow a similar protocol for checking the SPDZ shares bi and the MACs ci.
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13. Finally, if the previous step executes successfully, then the parties will release their plaintext shares of
wfinal by decommitting to the encrypted ciphers of those shares and publishing their plaintext shares.
We now prove that the distribution of the simulator is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution
of the real world execution. To do so, we construct hybrid distributions.
Hybrid 1 This is the real world execution.
Hybrid 2 Same as hybrid 1, except replace the proofs from the input preparation phase with simulators.
Hybrid 1 and 2 are indistinguishable because of the properties of the zero-knowledge proofs we utilize
(see Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
Hybrid 3 Same as the previous hybrid, except the rest of the proofs are run with the simulated proofs instead,
and the secret sharing is replaced by the simulator Sa. However, step 12 is still run with the real world
execution.
Hybrid 2 and 3 are statistically indistinguishable because of the properties of the zero-knowledge proofs
(Theorem 2, Theorem 3), and the fact that the secret sharing is also simulatable (Theorem 5).
Hybrid 4 Same as the previous hybrid, except swap out the real world execution with step 12 described by
the simulator.
Hybrid 3 and 4 are statistically indistinguishable. The abort probabilities in step 12 are based on the
release values, so we just need to argue that the release value distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
Since the simulator is always able to extract the adversary’s values, it will always be able to calculate the
correct answer in step 12. The real world execution, on the other hand, could potentially have a different
answer if any of the zero-knowledge proofs fails to correctly detect wrong behavior. Therefore, if the
zero-knowledge proofs are working correctly, then:
1. If the execution does not abort, then the decrypted values must be both divisible by p. The two values are
statistically indistinguishable because of Lemma 1.
2. If the execution does abort, then S’s output value would be v. If the proofs pass, then from the argument
made in step 12 where we know that the decrypted value modulo p is exactly the same as v. Furthermore,
if we subtract v from the two values, the new values have the same distribution by the argument in the
prior step.
If any proof does fail to detect a malicious adversary cheating, then the released answer could be
potentially different. However, this will happen with negligible probability because of the properties of the
zero-knowledge proofs we are using. Therefore, the hybrids are statistically indistinguishable.
Hybrid 5 First, define  to be ciphertext addition,  to be ciphertext subtraction, and   to be ciphertext
multiplication. Replace the input encryptions of the honest parties with encryptions where EncPK(xi) is
transformed into EncPK(0) is transformed into Blind(EncPK(0) EncPK(b)) (EncPK(xi)  (EncPK(1)
EncPK(b))), where b = 0. Hybrid 4 and 5 are computationally indistinguishable because the inputs used
by the honest parties have not changed from the previous hybrid. With the guarantees of the encryption
algorithm, the encrypted ciphers from the two hybrids are also indistinguishable.
Hybrid 6 Replace the input encryptions of the honest parties with encryptions of 0 (so same as the simulator),
except with additional randomizers such that the encryption of an input EncPK(0) is transformed into
Blind(EncPK(0)  EncPK(b)) (EncPK(xi)  (EncPK(1) EncPK(b))), where b = 1.
Hybrid 5 and 6 are indistinguishable because one could use a distinguisher D to break the underlying
encryption scheme. Since the encrypted ciphertexts are randomized and only differ by the value of b (whether
it is 0 or 1), if one were to build such a distinguisher D, then D can also distinguish whether b = 0 or b = 1.
This breaks the semantic encryption scheme.
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Hybrid 7 This is the simulator’s distribution.
Hybrid 6 and 7 are indistinguishable because the inputs are distributed exactly the same (they are all 0’s).
This completes our proof.
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